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Abstract 
   The idea of a direct relationship between economics and politics in the international are-
na, which early economists assumed but later professional economists generally down-
played, has only recently come to be widely accepted. This simple idea that economics and 
politics powerfully interact with each other has since the early 1970s spurred the develop-
ment of a field of both political science and economics, i.e., international political economy 
(IPE). 
   This paper reviews a selection of the most influential literature on two of the most im-
portant sets of questions at the heart of IPE: 1) What is the nature of the relationship be-
tween politics and economics, and how is that relationship properly characterized? The 
statist, liberal economic, and leftist schools of thought have contended to explain how the 
IPE really works. 2) What should be the agenda of IPE for the twenty-first century? A 
recasting of the major theories is necessary to bring them in line with the changed realities of 
the post-Cold War, globalized world. 
   The field of IPE needs a major reworking to improve its explanatory power and policy 
prescription capacity. This can begin with recognition of ample opportunities for conver-
gence among the three major theoretical approaches that have dominated IPE from the be-
ginning. 
Keywords: international political economy, statism, capitalist developmental state, 
          economic liberalism, Marxism-Leninism
Introduction
   The postwar international political economy has undergone major transitions at a faster 
pace than ever before. In the past thirty years, the U.S. as the dominant economic and political 
power of the early Cold War era, experienced decline relative to its European and Japanese 
allies, while its erstwhile Soviet nemesis ank into a morass of inefficiency and stagnation, and 
gradually imploded. The energy crisis of the 1970s for the first time confronted an emerging
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global economy with the specter of widespread scarcity. China arose from a century of 
stagnation to fast-growth development, first through communist collectivization, then much 
more impressively through a hybrid of market economics and centralized planning. The 
developing world, experimenting with various state-dominated evelopment schemes in the 
1960s, by the late 1980s largely accepted free-market capitalism. 
   The world is only now digesting these changes, as a major financial crisis hit in the fall of 
2008. The idea of a direct relationship between economics and politics in the international 
arena, which early economists assumed but later professional economists generally 
downplayed, has only recently come to be widely accepted. IPE distinguishes itself from simple 
political economy, which attempts to explain such common domestic concerns as economic 
efficiency, economic justice, why markets work, and the relationship between the financial 
 sector and the "real" economy.' As Underhill notes, power and wealth have been closely 
linked throughout history, in the modern era in the form of nation-states and market economies. 
Political economy, he states, "is the means by which economic structures, in particular the 
structures of the market, are established and in turn transformed," i.e., "economic structures 
and processes are the results of political interactions. "2) 
   This compelling yet simple idea — that economics and politics powerfully interact with 
each other — has since the late 1960s to early 1970s spurred the development of a field of both 
political science and economics, i.e., international political economy (IPE). The growing 
interdependence created by the Bretton Woods economic regime of the postwar era in the first 
thirty years of postwar economic growth, along with growing "cracks" in the Bretton Woods 
system that would soon bring it down made it apparent to observers that key economic 
interactions are the result of political processes within political institutions. In the 1970s, IPE 
scholarship was dominated by dependency and hegemonic stability theory, while in the 1980s 
and 1990s economic liberalism prevailed, and discussion shifted to domestic political theories of 
political economy.3) Today, IPE uses a variety of approaches derived from differing ideological 
perspectives. 
   This paper reviews a selection of the most influential literature on the nature of the 
relationship between politics and economics, and asks how that relationship is properly 
characterized. Three major schools of thought have contended to explain how the IPE really 
works, and due to space limitations, this paper considers three of them.4) IPE is about the 
relationship of wealth and power in the modern world.
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Theoretical Approaches to Political Economy 
   While the field of IPE is less than forty years old, the major theoretical approaches it uses 
date back to the mid-eighteenth century. All began with fairly unified "classical" positions up 
to the mid-nineteenth century, but subsequently went through major reworkings in the decades 
before World War I, and again in the post-World War II era; they have since branched into 
 several sub-approaches.5) A third approach, involving leftist or radical ideas, today no longer 
has a wide following, but acts as a vital critique of the other two. 
Statist Approaches: Mercantilism and Economic Nationalism. The first version of state-
centric approaches, which arose in the nineteenth centuries, is usually called Neo-mercantilism.6> 
Early statists such as Hamilton and List developed the notion of relatively undeveloped nations 
that seek to attain self-sufficiency and industrialization, mainly through protectionism, 
subsidies, and fostering of "strategic industries," (usually heavy industries). Gilpin calls this 
"economic nationalism," but it was more commonly labeled Neo-Mercantilism in the postwar 
era. Economic nationalists give politics precedence over economics, and press nations to 
achieve relative economic advantage over others. 
   For realists such as Spero, politics determines economic policy, and this has been the case 
throughout history. Mercantilism was pursued by rising European states because for the first 
time economies became primary arenas for political action. The British free trading system of 
the nineteenth century could only be put into force because of Britain's powerful position, and 
the imperialist system of the late nineteenth century collapsed due to the draining effect of 
World War I. In its place arose the highly geopolitical bipolar division after World War II. The 
result was a world economy divided along political lines into at least three "subsystems. "v) The 
two decades of the post-Cold War world have seen a brief unipolar moment in which the U.S. 
dominated both international politics and the international economy, and then the sidetrack of 
the "War on Terrorism" and the Iraq War, in which the U.S. ineffectually emphasized military 
over economic means of dominance. 
   Economic nationalism's trong point, says Gilpin, is its focus on the state as an engine of 
development. However, he feels that it has three weaknesses. First, the international economy 
is not a kind of zero-sum game, and sometimes, all may gain. Secondly, nationalism proposes no 
theory to explain either how domestic politics fits into development or why nationalism occurs. 
Thirdly, in over-emphasizing industry, it also overstates the state's role. The state plays a 
necessary but not a sufficient role in economic development. This slights the important role of 
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 agriculture in economic advance,8 e.g. postwar land reform programs in Japan, Taiwan, and 
South Korea that provided a basis for economic takeoff, contrasted with lackluster efforts in the 
Philippines or Mexico which have contributed to continued endemic poverty. 
   Since the 1970s, there has been a revival of statist approaches to both economics and 
political science, which view the state as the key actor in economic development. Krasner sees 
a state's "autonomy," or independence from societal interests and pressures, and "capacity," 
i.e., a state's ability to implement its policies, as critical to its ability to get things done. He also 
draws attention to continuities and consistency in state policymaking, e.g., U.S. energy policy 
throughout the postwar era. Elsewhere, he presents international regimes, i.e., institutions, 
norms and procedures governing particular areas of economic activity, as forums wherein 
developing nations can gain occasional advantages over developed industrial firms or nations.9) 
Using the Korean case, Amsden emphasizes the importance of "late development," in which 
the state becomes the catalyst of economic transformation and mediator of market forces, 
through two methods: distortion of "relative prices in order to stimulate economic activity," and 
setting of performance standards and encouragement of the formation of the family-run chaebol 
conglomerates.10) Johnson stresses the capitalist developmental state, a mid-twentieth century 
variant of Neo-Mercantilism, in which state economic policy was guided by powerful ministries 
given sufficient authority to craft market-conforming "indicative planning" and support rising 
industries or cushion declining sectors.h1) 
   The recent record of state-led economic development programs has been mixed. Many 
state economic development programs in developing countries have failed because of an over-
emphasis on heavy industrialization and large projects, which Frieden illustrates, have ended in 
gigantic foreign debts. By contrast, at least until the onset of the 1997 Asian economic risis, 
many of the export-led efforts of East and Southeast Asian states led the region to 
unprecedented prosperity.12) Olson shows that economic policy success can actually undermine 
state effectiveness, as political stability and economic prosperity spawn special interests that 
can reduce economic efficiency.13) However, Amsden, who made her name illustrating the 
effectiveness of the South Korean state, presents Taiwan as the exemplar of fast-developing 
late developing countries that use economies of scale, highly developed skills, increased 
corporate concentration, and globalization etworks to stay ahead of economic competition.14) 
She also distinguishes those late developers which pursued successful industrial strategies from 
"the rest," i.e., those that failed to do so. The successful cases effectively used skill and 
knowledge assets, created effective government policy tools ("control mechanism[s]") along 
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with strong state institutions, developed strong national companies, and worked toward fairer 
 distribution of societal resources.15) Kohli uses a traditional statist approach to show that the 
"way state power is organized and used has decisively influenced rates and patterns of 
industrialization in the global periphery." Among types of states, the "cohesive-capitalist" 
states, such as those of the fast-growth East Asian economies, have been most successful. 
What they had in common was a strong commitment both to growth and supporting efficient 
over inefficient producers. South Korea, Brazil, and India were, to varying degrees, successful, 
while Nigeria failed to industrialize.16> 
   Liberal approaches: Liberalism, Classical and Neoclassical economics. The first direct 
challenge to Neo-mercantilism came from what came to be known in the nineteenth century as 
liberalism. Classical and neoclassical economics has had great success in the form of a social 
science in Western countries, but is best "understood as both...economic analysis and as 
ideology." Central to this approach is the concept of "interconnected and self-regulating" 
markets that bring buyers and sellers together and which need only minimal government 
regulation. Free market economics assumes that private property is a good thing, while 
extensive government intervention in the market is generally not helpful.17) As embodied in 
classical economic theory, liberalism asserts that there is or should be little relationship 
between politics and economics.18 Individuals are the basic unit of analysis, and function 
rationally in the aggregate according to price signals supplied by the marketplace. States 
should only assist markets through programs that help in "getting the prices right." If 
governments limit intervention to those actions that ensure competition, or in neoclassical 
terms correct "market imperfections," both domestic and international economics can function 
harmoniously. Further, everyone in a market economy benefits in the long run from free trade, 
which involves the relative absence of tariffs, controls, and regulations on trade.19) Liberalism 
became the hallmark of nineteenth century British and twentieth century American free trade 
policies that culminated in the post-World War II open trade regime.20) 
   Neo-liberalism has provided the basic ideological prop for American foreign economic 
policy since World War II. Under attack during the 1960s and 1970s as developing countries 
gained their independence and sought to find autonomy through remaining non-aligned in the 
Cold War, neo-liberalism was resurgent by the 1980s as the "Washington consensus" 
determined the policy direction of international organizations such as the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank.21) By the 1990s, various writers were proclaiming the 
triumph of global capitalism. Fukuyama famously suggests that the major questions of history 
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had been resolved by the end of the Cold War and the failure of socialism. Friedman asserts that 
political reform and more effective governance would flow from capitalism's victory. 
Mandelbaum presents modern liberalism as self-reinforcing system, in which peace, free 
 markets, and democracy work hand-in-hand.22) Easterly suggests that the incentive structure 
inherent in modern capitalism is the key to understanding development. Success or failure of 
economic policy, especially in developing countries, is almost entirely due to the presence or 
absence of powerful economic incentives.23) 
   In the last two decades, classical ideas of market rationality have been applied to public 
policy through rational choice or "public choice" theories, such as those of Frey.24) Meanwhile, 
globalization of the world economy has spawned a high degree of interdependence, and has 
stimulated interdependence theories, by scholars such as Cooper, Baldwin, and Keohane and 
Nye. Features of such interdependence include a greater percent of exports in national 
economies, enhanced labor movement among countries, heightened international investment 
flows, and ever more technology exchanges. Increased international trade "erodes" the 
effectiveness of both the domestic and international economic policies of a nation.25) 
   Gilpin lists what he believes are limitations inherent in the approach when used as political 
prescription. First, it is possible everyone can lose, as well as gain, from open trade. Secondly, 
by erecting an "artificial" separation between politics and economics, economic liberals 
generally accept the status quo as given, tend to downplay if not ignore issues of economic 
justice or equity, and assume trade is often free when it usually is not. Moreover, economic 
analyses are just snapshots in time and inflexibly subject to stringent conditions.26) Economists 
are also criticized for hyper-abstraction and over-reliance on models, inability to account for the 
economic dislocations of the 1970s and 1980s, and the lack of predictive power of such models. 
   An application of the liberal approach to economic development is the modernization 
school, which lays out capital accumulation and industrialization as the primary agenda of 
developing countries, and insists that "barriers" presented by traditional economics and culture 
must be overcome. It further asserts that the forces of development must be generated 
internally, and that international actors play at best only a supporting role. After its heyday in 
the 1950s-1960s, major criticisms of its simplistic models, positivist assumptions, and 
disastrous applications by U.S. aid officials in Latin America and Asia forced modernization to 
retreat from grand theory to empirical, economics-related studies. Mittelman and Pasha 
believe that it still has limited utility since it fails to address issues of globalization, state power, 
and class.27)
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   Radical Approaches: Marxism, Dependency, and World Systems. The link between 
economic liberalism and the rise of industrial capitalism created an inviting target for political 
radicals in the nineteenth century, as the ascendant liberalism generated a strong reaction in 
utopian socialism and Marxism. In its early forms, Marx's work was primarily an indictment of 
the capitalist system as then practiced in Europe, but gradually became an alternative conomic 
theory, as well. There have been at least four major varieties of Marxism: classic nineteenth 
century Marxism, Marxism-Leninism, Euro-socialism and Maoism. These have provided an 
intellectual and policy smorgasbord for leftists, but have also weakened any effort by adherents 
to achieve any degree of intellectual consensus. Marx presented classes in conflict over an 
exploitive mode of production, out of which would evolve the socialist state. His theory of value 
posited a zero-sum game between workers and capitalists in industrial economies, tending 
toward over-production and economic depression. Lenin's amendments moved the conflictual 
arena to the world stage, and asserted that capitalists were dealing with endemic over-
production and over-accumulation of capital by selling goods overseas and exporting capital to 
colonies, from which they gained raw materials. Fewer colonies to pick from would naturally 
lead to war among the major capitalist nations.28) Maoism stresses the key role of peasants in 
revolutions taking place in agrarian societies, and the need for continual revolution to avoid the 
perceived trap of a "bourgeois" Soviet-style communism. Aside from its ascendance in China, 
popular Maoist movements had mixed success in Cambodia, Peru, and more recently Nepal. 
   Marxism begins as a strong critique of capitalism, and (we often forget) a branch of 
classical economics. Marxism takes up such vital issues as the role of class in a society, 
exploitation of workers, the development of monopolies, the "expansionary nature" of 
capitalism, uneven development, economic alienation, and the role of the state. Study of Marx 
remains important, asserts Stillwell, because of its importance to the development of 
economics, its value as a lens to examine capitalism, and its influence throughout the modern 
 world.29) 
   Whatever its form, Marxism has always faced strong critiques. Rosecrance notes that 
Lenin and the dependency theorists (discussed below) seem to be talking about two different 
developing worlds, Lenin's a concentrated colonialism and dependency's a patchwork of 
poverty.30) Gilpin maintains that Marxism correctly hones in on the production problem as the 
center of economic oncerns, properly notes the division of labor in all societies, and usefully 
points out the tendency of capitalism to expand. Even so, he feels that a close reading of history 
does not support Lenin's thesis that imperialism led to World War I; it was more likely 
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 territorial rivalry in Europe proper.31) 
   Other indictments of Marxism include its almost religious-like ideology, the poor human 
rights record of Marxist regimes, and the inability of much of the former Soviet bloc countries 
to deliver either long-term economic growth or a rising standard of living. Also, Marxist-
Leninist regimes have not been averse to turning their ideology on its head to suit 
circumstances, e.g., the Chinese ideological supports for its pragmatic post-1978 economic 
reforms (which it calls "market socialism," "commodity socialism" or the "first stage of 
socialism."). 
   Furthermore, the political economic record of industrial countries in the past century has 
fulfilled much of the socialist agenda without a triumph of Communism. Finally, Marxism has 
not even been very helpful at alleviating the misery of the developing countries, in any case: 
Cuba depended on Soviet aid throughout he Cold War, and Soviet clients such as Nicaragua, 
Vietnam, and Ethiopia saw only marginal economic improvements under socialism. Though 
history has not been kind to Marxism, it is useful as a theoretical counterweight to liberalism 
and for the political economy issues that it raises. 
   Chilcote and others note that Marxismlacks a coherent theory of economic development, 
and thus needed to be supplemented by dependency and other theories.32) Many radical 
theorists of the last thirty years confront the perceived developed capitalist domination of the 
agrarian, cheap-labor developing world, and counter the major premises of modernization 
theory, i.e., national development is shaped by the international environment, and not by the 
phantom of the "dual societies," or traditional vs. modern sectors. Structuralists such as 
Prebisch assert that, if developing nations only gain control of international organizations and 
force changes in international trade and aid regimes, and adopt import-substituting national 
economy policies, escape from endemic poverty is possible. Dependency theorists (or 
dependencistas) find such notions naively optimistic, and insist that the chances for development 
are either constricted or ni1.33) For Goulet, domination of poor nations by the rich is nothing less 
than a world ethical crisis. 
   Dependency theory is like a shrub with many branches, each a sub-theory with different 
emphases. Four dependency approaches tand out. First, Frank presents the concept of "un-
derdevelopment," i.e., stunted national and local development resulting from and conditioned 
by relationships between the currently developed metropole (neo-colonial power) and a poor 
satellite. Second, Baran and Sweezy update Leninism by examining the impact of U.S. "mono-
poly capitalism," operating through American foreign policy, on poor nations. Dos Santos 
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describes the "New Dependency," based on investments by multinational corporations (MNCs, 
see below) that predominated in the early postwar era. Cardoso explains growth in the Newly 
Industrializing Countries (NICs) as "associated dependent development," where development 
can take place, but only within an international environment conditioned by the developed 
 nations  .m) 
World systems theory differs only by degree from dependency. Most commonly associated 
with Wallerstein, it focuses on the supposed historical development of a world capitalist system, 
involving an expanding global market and the operations of great powers, since the sixteenth 
century. Wallerstein separates the world into three categories: 1) core, or dominant economic 
and political powers, 2) periphery, the poor countries that serve as sources of raw materials and 
markets for the core, and 3) semi-periphery, i.e., countries that in many ways function as 
periphery for the core, but which have developed sophisticated economies that exhibit core 
features. Within each of the three is its own core and periphery, as well. This tri-level system is 
never static, as keen competition among core nations juggles world power, and nations ascend 
to semi-periphery and core, or fall out of the core.35) Radical or leftist schools are left much as 
they were at the end of the Cold War, when they seemed discredited with the "triumph of 
capitalism" but, given that inequality is still very much a reality in the age of globalization, it is 
probably premature to count them out. 
   Updating the Three Approaches: Post-Cold War Refinements. Each of the three main 
theoretical approaches has made major contributions to our understanding of the relationship 
between wealth and power. They show us, respectively, the critical importance of states, free 
markets, and historical forces in the creation of modern economies. Even so, each largely 
neglects or downplays the signal contributions of the other.36) The end of the Cold War 
(1989 — 1991) was hailed as a triumph of liberal capitalism, but can any theoretical approach 
claim preeminence in an era that has profoundly transformed capitalism itself? 
   Cooper, Gilpin and others may be right when they affirm the growingdegree of economic 
interdependence today. Not even the great powers can consider themselves truly self-
sufficient. The USSR may come closest, but its economy lagged behind the West. As 
Rosecrance suggests, the result could be a return to unlimited military competition, but the 
costs of arms races and wars has become too great. 
   All the major IPE schools have been forcedto rethink their major ideas since the end of the 
Cold War. For instance, during the 1990s, liberals had to admit the failures of "Big Bang" or 
"shock therapy" liberalization programs in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union,37) and 
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 for the contributions that unbridled capitalism made to the Asian Financial Crisis (1997 –  1998). 
Barber and others note that capitalism and free markets are inherently unstable when pushed 
too far, and capitalism often works against democratization.38) Nonetheless, the liberalization 
program in India and the deepening of China's market-oriented reforms and its accession to the 
WTO in 2001 confirm liberal prescriptions to other observers. State management of economies 
has been complicated by increasing interdependence, ven as "pragmatic mercantilism" has 
become more widely accepted.39) Even the Neo-mercantilist states of East Asia have been far 
less interventionist after the Asian Financial Crisis, and have allowed much freer imports and 
foreign investment. Notably, the New Labour policies of British prime minister Tony Blair 
stimulated much discussion of a European "Third Way" somewhere between socialism and 
liberalism. In the more constrained budget environment of the 1990s and 2000s, statists must 
contend with the fiscal and international financial limitations placed on state policy, and with 
rising public demands for basic rights.40) Radicals, and especially Marxists, seek to adapt their 
ideas to a largely post-communist, post-welfare state world. The perceived success of 
capitalism may make Marxism and other radical approaches more relevant than ever, as it 
shows the power of their earlier predictions of capitalism's current dominance.41) Radicals also 
shine a light on issues neglected by free marketeers and statists, especially the environment, 
labor rights, the economic role of technology, class, gender, and ethnicity.42) Latin America has 
seen a marked shift to the left in recent elections, and socialist parties remain robust in both 
Western and Eastern Europe. 
   Stillwell suggests four major concerns that should inform future political economy 
discourse. These are Economy-nature, Economy-technology, Economy-society, and Economy-
state, which concern, respectively, the environment, industrial relations and engineering, social 
and cultural problems, and politics. He feels that the most important of these is Economy-
nature, since it concerns the sustainability of the modern global economy. Economy-technology 
has become ever more important due to the rapid pace of technological change in the past thirty 
years. Economy-society increasingly turns on concerns about class, gender, and 
ethnicity — especially, one might argue, in the post-9/11 world. Economy-state now focuses on 
state capacity and governance in an era of limits.43)
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 An Agenda for 21s'  Century IPE 
   As the world stares down a financial crisis and perhaps a prolonged recession, it is an 
excellent time for stock-taking and rethinking. How should the field develop over the next 
thirty years, what should be its theoretical foci, and what should be its major concerns? The 
first major need is for harmonization of the major theoretical approaches. All have made major 
conceptual contributions to understanding the roles of states, markets, and historical forces in 
the rise of modern economies. All have yielded useful insights into the real working of the global 
economy, yet all so far have failed to transcend their ideological and Cold War origins. All must 
begin with a radical (in the sense of fundamental) recognition of their limitations, and then work 
toward creation of new interim theories that can bridge the divides with other theoretical 
approaches. The following are three such interim theoretical bridges. Super-state would 
supersede all state-based theories. While embracing the continued importance of the state, it 
would recognize both its severe limitations in an era of globalization, and examine the changed 
role of the state since the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 Incident. It would suggest hat the 
Japan Model of state-as-economic-manager no longer works, and that the state must operate in 
an evolving, negotiable environment more resembling labor-management relations. 
   Liberal economic liberalism would replace all market-based theories. While noting the 
ascendance of market forces in the post-Cold War world, it would acknowledge the abject 
failures of economic liberalization and free trade/free market policies in much of the world. 
Neo-liberal policies caused or played a strong role in most of the economic alamities of the past 
thirty years, from the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s to the Asian Financial Crisis, to 
the global financial crisis of 2008. By contrast, the relative success of market-oriented reforms 
in China, India, and Brazil has been largely due to their pragmatism, and the recovery of Russia 
in this decade has been in part due to a very strong state. New economic stars such as Finland, 
Estonia, and Chile successfully mixed elements from various economic models. Economic 
management seems to work when it has a place for both market and regulation, freedom and 
responsibility, looseness and control. 
   Conventional radicalism,arepackaging of the best of leftist ideas, does not concede the field 
to other theories just because socialism did not work well in the Soviet Union and other Marxist-
Leninist countries. It would present itself as the indispensable alternative theory, the necessary 
critique of triumphant capitalism, and the essential /accuse against the continued distortions of 
global economies and politics in favor of the already powerful. What of value is left in the left? 
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There is so much: Marx's stressing of the importance of historical forces and the key role of 
class, dependency's indictment of the fundamentally unfair international economic system, and 
world system's sketching of systemic dynamics that have gathered pace over the past 500 
years. 
   So, what will the harmonizing theory look finally look like? It will probably stress the key 
role of the state, albeit a transformed and/or limited one. It will likely emphasize the continued 
vital role of markets, but markets that are riddled with imperfections and that need effective 
 governance. It will describe the most important systemic dynamics that guide global economics 
as never before. Finally, it will include one more transcendent element that can bind all 
theories, but which heretofore has largely been ignored: the environmental ethic and 
imperative of the twenty-first century. Climate change brings so many issues together, since 
they must all be addressed in order to save our civilization: energy supply, production and use; 
transportation modes and access; management of global resources, especially the rainforests, 
seas, and polar regions; political cooperation ecessary to bring about global change and foster 
cleaner technologies; economic osts and opportunities that must be shared as we decide how to 
confront a century-long challenge; and religious and ethical thinking that can shift our cultures 
from consumerism to environmental stewardship. 
   The second major need is for an understanding of the changed geopolitical and economic 
landscape of this century. Globalization, already a powerful force in the last two decades of the 
twentieth century, has become perhaps even more important in this decade. However powerful 
and omnipresent a force globalization may have become, it is still in many ways a limited affair, 
and these limits are laid bare by the increasing popularity and strength of regionalization, which 
is globalization's rebellious little sister. All other IPE concerns, then, flow from globalization, 
and maybe we should consider renaming the field global political economy. Global trade, 
finance, and production, as well as global socio-political values and culture, are now at the 
center of the international political economy, though effects of globalization are both uneven 
and not always what we expect. For instance, scholars often point to the supposed decline of 
the nation-state as a direct result of globalization, yet since 9/11 in the arenas of national 
security and defense, Western states have become more powerful than ever. Global finance, a 
subject left to money managers and policy wonks in normal times, has as a result of the recent 
global crisis been thrust back to center stage where it rightly belongs. Scholars should keep 
their spotlight on it once the crisis has subsided. Global trade has stalled, in part due to the 
failure of the Doha Round of WTO negotiations, but also because the gradually rising impor-
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tance of regional and national trade relative to global trade. In an era of environmental 
 constraints and strained commodity prices, it will be even harder for trade to benefit both 
developed and developing countries. Without major alterations, the Asian Model of 
development may no longer be available in much of the world. 
   Global environmental concerns have a dual character. Climate change has changed 
everything, and no one on the planet is immune to its effects. We may be coming to the end of 
the road for a very dirty and unsustainable model of industrial development, and for the first 
time in this decade a gathering global scientific and political consensus recognizes the urgency 
of effective mitigation policies. The 2006 Stern Report for the British government suggested 
that there is both risk and opportunity in climate change; if we devote more efforts to green 
technologies, it will actually stimulate the global economy. Even so, incautious or rushed 
environmental policies risk hamstringing the global economy and actually worsening environ-
mental difficulties. Finally, the supposed triumph of global capitalism and of the globalization 
concept have led us to neglect issues of poverty, equality, social justice, and failed states. 
Without addressing the needs of the half of humanity that has been left out of the economic 
booms and technological progress of the past three decades, globalization will never become 
truly global. 
   A final major need, perhaps ultimately more a service to humanity than a scholarly task, is 
a complete reexamination of capitalism itself. The recent world financial crisis has starkly 
illustrated the imperfections of global capitalism: its dodgy money and securities chemes, its 
tendency to subvert or avoid even modest, prudent regulation, its continual drift toward 
institutionalized corruption, and its callousness toward the suffering of ordinary, unknowing 
people who get caught in the wrong job, investment or mortgaged house at the wrong time. 
Add to those sins the unsustainability, environmental degradation and hyper-materialism ofour 
current economic system, and perhaps the time for sweeping reform is overdue. We cannot be 
excused from looking for ways to improve capitalism, or perhaps eventually to replace it with a 
more sustainable, humane, and ultimately efficient system that serves us all better.
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